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  “Substantial downzoning” is defined as the exercise of police power to significantly reduce the 
legally permitted density on undeveloped land in a community. This contentious practice is 
typically challenged by those who perceive the action to limit their market opportunities (e.g., 
farmers and developers), their sympathizers, and others who prefer the status quo. Supporters 
tend to be those who perceive positive benefits (e.g., environmentalists, conservationists, and 
homeowners) and those who see it as a supplement to other preservation techniques, based on 
concerns over such things as growing public costs of land acquisition, limited effectiveness of 
existing alternatives, or the perceived urgency to act to manage growth. 
      Given the complexity of the issue and the lack of previous research, this paper develops a 
conceptual model of the public choice to “substantially downzone” and presents specific hy-
potheses to be empirically tested, using New Jersey as a case study. The probability of imple-
menting substantial downzoning is found to increase with (i) the amount of open space that 
remains to be protected, (ii) declining farm population, (iii) recent growth in non-farm popula-
tion, (iv) recent growth in land values, and (v) the presence of alternative growth management 
tools. Results also suggest its use as a substitute for other preservation tools when the financial 
and/or political ability of communities to afford other approaches is limited. Hence, the likeli-
hood of substantial downzoning may increase over time if alternatives become more difficult 
to implement. 
 




The post-war period in the United States has gen-
erally been characterized by population growth in 
rural and suburban communities, coupled with 
declines in nearby central cities (Orfield 1997). 
The consequences of this trend include the loss of 
open space and farmland, higher property taxes 
due to added infrastructure and service costs, 
concerns about traffic congestion, and fears about 
declining school quality. Concerns about these 
consequences have led to greater desire to man-
age unfettered growth at the urban-rural fringe 
and combat what is popularly known as “urban 
sprawl” (Burchell et al. 1998, Daniels 1999, p. 44). 
Various growth management tools have emerged, 
including purchase of development rights (PDR) 
on agricultural or open land, transfer of develop-
ment rights, infrastructure concurrency require-
ments, development impact fees, clustering re-
quirements, urban growth boundaries, and combi-
nations thereof (see Adelaja and Schilling 1998, 
Kelly 1993, SmartGrowth Network 2002). 
  As a growth management or preservation tool, 
communities have always used their police power 
to reduce the legal density allowed on undevel-
oped land (increasing minimum residential lot 
sizes) through zoning and rezoning. This move 
“down” the hierarchy of land uses toward those 
that are less intensive (see Alonso 1964) is typi-
cally referred to as “downzoning.” Downzoning 
is not always controversial. However, “substantial 
downzoning,” which occurs when the degree of 
downzoning is substantial, is highly controversial. 
The growing incidence of substantial downzoning 
in many highly urbanized U.S. states, especially 
New Jersey, has created significant concern among 
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farmers and other major owners of undeveloped 
land (Etgen et al. 2003, Samuels 2004). They 
often argue that substantial downzoning amounts 
to “takings,” is motivated largely by anti-growth 
and preservation sentiments, and is implemented 
as an unfair substitute for market-based options 
such as PDR. Because it is perceived to effec-
tively reallocate property rights, “substantial down-
zoning” elicits strong proponents and opponents 
in communities where it is being considered or 
implemented (Fischel 1985). 
  Opponents of substantial downzoning typically 
include a subset of farmers and other owners of a 
substantial parcel of land who believe that the 
policy will lower the market value of their land. 
The concerns of these opponents appear to be 
validated by Vaillancourt and Monty (1985), who 
showed that exclusive agricultural zoning resulted 
in a 15–30 percent reduction in agricultural land 
values, and by Foley (2004), who showed an in-
verse relationship between minimum lot size and 
price per acre of undeveloped land. Opponents 
also often include sympathizers who do not see 
substantial downzoning as contributing to long-
term open space preservation because it results in 
land use patterns that are not sustainable. Oppo-
nents have also tended to include those who do 
not own developable land in the community, but 
who worry about the lack of affordable housing 
or limited development opportunities. Their con-
cerns appear to be validated by Glaeser and Gy-
ourko (2003), who argue that zoning and other 
land use controls play the dominant role in mak-
ing housing expensive (see also Katz and Rosen 
1977, Pollakowski and Wachter 1977). 
  Proponents of substantial downzoning, how-
ever, typically include local residents who believe 
that it could potentially provide financial, envi-
ronmental, amenity, and/or fiscal benefits to them 
and/or the community (Fischel 1985, Rudel 1989, 
Richardson 2003). For example, homeowners 
may expect increased property values as a result 
of the above-mentioned benefits. Gottlieb and 
Adelaja (2004) estimate an average increase in 
residential property values of 5.8 percent in com-
munities where substantial downzoning has oc-
curred. This suggests that non-farmers do realize 
pecuniary gains from downzoning, while farmers 
may experience losses. 
  The line between proponents and opponents of 
substantial downzoning is not that easy to draw. 
However, it is typically the case that opponents 
are almost exclusively farmers, while proponents 
are almost exclusively non-farmers. The criti-
cisms by farmers of substantial downzoning at the 
urban fringe often centers on its constituting the 
wipeout of farmers’ wealth (“takings”), to the 
benefit of other residents. Given the controversy 
surrounding substantial downzoning, the limited 
literature on the subject, and its potential effects 
on the relative wealth and welfare of various in-
terest groups, it is important to clarify the politi-
cal economy of the issue. Of particular impor-
tance are (i) how various interest groups align 
with respect to substantial downzoning, (ii) what 
their motivations are, and (iii) the complementar-
ity of the action to other growth management 
tools. Understanding these can help to improve 
the ability to predict when, where, and how sub-
stantial downzoning would occur, and the ability 
to forecast land consumption and landscape 
change. Studies are beginning to recognize that a 
community’s choice of zoning restrictiveness 
should be treated endogenously in land use analy-
sis (Chressanthis 1986, Pogodzinski and Sass 
1994, Wallace 1988, White 1988, Rolleston 1987). 
This study would add to the literature and provide 
a framework for endogenizing zoning in land use 
modeling. 
  This paper develops a conceptual public choice 
model designed to explain how proponents and 
opponents influence the elected leadership to im-
plement substantial downzoning at the urban 
fringe. It hypothesizes that such downzoning will 
tend to be implemented when (i) development 
pressure is strong, (ii) land values are high and 
rising, and (iii) there remains significant open 
space to protect; but when (iv) it has become dif-
ficult to preserve using alternative mechanisms. 
Therefore, substantial downzoning is made nec-
essary by the urgency of encroaching develop-
ment and the rising cost of acquiring land or de-
velopment rights through market-oriented ap-
proaches. These hypotheses are tested using New 
Jersey as a case study. For example, the effects of 
the number and proportion of farmers who vote in 
a community on the probability of substantial 
downzoning imposed by non-farmers is examined 
(Fischel 1985, Furuseth 1985a, Rudel 1989). Also 
examined is the notion that non-farmers support 
downzoning when they are concerned about open 
space or other fiscal issues related to unfettered 
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  New Jersey provides an excellent case study of 
political issues emerging at the urban-rural fringe, 
including the phenomenon of “substantial down-
zoning.” In the survey of New Jersey municipali-
ties conducted in 2003 as part of this study, some 
86 of the 266 surveyed communities reported 
significant increase in substantial downzoning 
since 1994 (a sharp increase over the pre-1994 
period). The entire state is contained within fed-
erally defined metropolitan areas, which means 
that virtually all agricultural areas are urban-in-
fluenced. While development pressure and land 
values in New Jersey have been unusually high 
(Plantinga, Lubowski, and Stavins 2002), the find-
ings from this analysis may be applicable to other 
parts of the Northeast and the country that are 
experiencing growth at the edge of large con-
tiguous areas of development, and where political 
traditions leave land use regulation largely in the 
hands of local governments. Furthermore, for 
these and other parts of the United States where 
suburban development is not as extensive as in 
New Jersey, the New Jersey case study provides a 
glimpse into future land use pressures and possi-




A distinction must be made between the motiva-
tions for “substantial downzoning” and the action 
itself. These motivations, their determinants, and 
various other social, economic, environmental, 
and landscape factors, are expected causes of the 
action itself and of other choices available to a 
community. Obviously, in urban fringe areas where 
the market value of farmland is significantly 
enhanced by development potential and specula-
tion, it is understandable that substantial down-
zoning would be viewed as a “takings” by owners 
of affected property, while easement purchase 
and other market-oriented preservation methods 
might not be. This implies that communities view 
substantial downzoning as an alternative to other 
preservation tools. 
  In developing a conceptual framework to ex-
plain substantial downzoning, it is appropriate to 
start with those motivations for preservation, con-
servation, and growth management that have been 
explored in the literature. The literature, which 
was pioneered by Gardner (1977), provides an in-
ventory of possible motivations and tools for 
farmland preservation. Where preservation is a 
goal of substantial downzoning, these motivations 
would apply. 
  With respect to initiation, although Furuseth 
(1985a, 1985b) finds that farmers often initiate 
rural preservation policies, including downzoning 
(see also Daniels 1999), anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that most contentious cases of substantial 
downzoning are initiated by non-farmers (preser-
vationists, the anti-growth movement, and others 
interested in conservation). Obviously, farmers 
are more likely to initiate preservation when it 
would be in their financial interest. This does not 
appear to be the case in highly urbanized areas 
where land values are high and substantial down-
zoning has been contentious because of its ex-
traordinary pecuniary impacts. 
  With respect to how the public aligns around 
issues such as substantial downzoning, the litera-
ture suggests that various interest groups will 
either support or oppose farmland preservation 
based on their views about a complex set of so-
cioeconomic, environmental, political, and other 
factors that vary according to the local context 
(Dye 1996, Hahn 1990, Rudel 1989, Knaap and 
Nelson 1992, Kline and Alig 1999, Kline 2006, 
Kotchen and Powers 2006). For example, Kline 
(2006) suggests that such socioeconomic trends 
as population growth, rising incomes, develop-
ment, and increasing open space scarcity motivate 
preservation. Kotchen and Powers (2006) also 
suggest the importance of existing open space 
patterns and funding sources slated to pay for pre-
servation in motivating preservation. The con-
texts found to produce differing motives and out-
comes in preservation include differences due to 
(i) urban fringe versus more outlying locations 
(Henneberry and Barrows 1990), (ii) type of com-
modity or agricultural operation (Adelaja and 
Friedman 1999, Daniels 1999), (iii) degree of re-
liance on land-based speculative returns vis-à-vis 
farm income (Adelaja 2004, Barton 1998), and 
(iv) characteristics and preferences of non-farm 
resident-voters (Adelaja and Friedman 1999, 
Frieden 1979). Given the potential complementar-
ity or substitutability of preservation tools and 
substantial downzoning, for analytical purposes 
these factors are considered to be relevant causes 
and motivations for substantial downzoning. 
  Extreme urban fringe environments, where land 
values are extremely high and where development 
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values, create a political economy context where 
contentious downzoning would more likely occur 
and one where commercial farmers would be 
united against substantial downzoning. These are, 
in essence, places that have experienced the pres-
sures of urbanization longer and more signifi-
cantly and that have therefore evolved more in a 
temporal sense under such pressures. Because of 
the correlation between land values, undeveloped 
land, and time, these places would also tend to 
have the least amount of open space remaining. 
 Although  urbanization  creates opportunities for 
greater profitability for some farmers, Lopez, 
Adelaja, and Andrews (1988) indicated that the 
net effect is negative at the level of the overall 
local farm economy. According to Lopez, Ade-
laja, and Andrews (1988) and Adelaja, Miller, 
and Taslim (1998), over time (or as the amount of 
open space remaining falls) urbanization is ex-
pected to have a negative impact on current farm 
profitability, but increases the importance of ex-
pected returns to land so farmers may come to 
rely more on land appreciation for their long-term 
welfare. If large-lot zoning prohibits a set of 
development options, it could reduce the price of 
farmland, especially in a place such as New Jer-
sey where, Plantinga, Lubowski, and Stavins 
(2002) report, over 80 percent of farmland values 
are attributable to development potential (see also 
Muth 1971, Wisand and Muth 1972, White 1988, 
and Fischel 1985). It is therefore understandable 
that farmers would fear the erosion of the value of 
their most important economic asset. Although 
the existence of a negative land value effect from 
downzoning remains controversial (see, e.g., 
Henneberry and Barrows 1990, Etgen et al. 2003, 
Samuels 2004, Spalatro and Provencher 2001), it 
is sufficient, for present purposes, to note that 
metropolitan farmers believe that significant down-
zoning hurts them and seek to avoid the effect of 
such restrictions on the value of their assets. The 
growing number of state-level Farm Bureaus 
adopting resolutions opposing downzoning pro-
vides evidence that these beliefs are widely 
shared. 
  The extreme urban fringe environment is also 
one where non-farm homeowners, conservation-
ists, and the anti-growth movement would typi-
cally unite in favor of substantial downzoning. 
For example, non-farm homeowners in those 
New Jersey communities where such downzoning 
has been contentious have overwhelmingly ex-
pressed strong support for it. The literature on 
local growth and anti-growth politics supports 
this notion by suggesting that communities with a 
high proportion of educated professionals whose 
livelihood does not depend on local growth or the 
exercise of development options would support 
anti-growth strategies such as downzoning. That 
tends to be the case at the urban fringe. The lit-
erature also suggests that support for anti-growth 
strategies is directly related to high socioeco-
nomic status and its attendant environmental con-
sciousness, and to the strong anti-growth senti-
ment that follows rapid landscape change in 
places where wealthy and politically influential 
people reside (Logan and Molotch 1987, Bates 
and Santerre 1994, Ihlanfeldt 2004, Pogodzinski 
and Sass 1994). Fischel (1985) posits that such 
homeowners have interests in zoning restrictive-
ness that are diametrically opposed to those of 
farmers, large landowners, and developers. For 
these reasons, the interests of farmers and non-
farm homeowners are assumed to be diametri-
cally opposed at the extreme urban fringe. 
  The incidence of substantial downzoning and 
its use as a strategy for growth management 
seems to be concentrated at extreme urban fringe 
environments. For example, this has been an issue 
of significant angst among farmers in New Jersey, 
Maryland, and other highly densely populated 
states. In evaluating the motivations for such 
downzoning, it makes sense to draw on observa-
tions from an environment where substantial down-
zoning has occurred, alongside environments 
where there is no downzoning. Our interest in this 
paper is contentious downzoning. In explaining it, 
it is important to account for the long list of fac-
tors that the literature suggests may explain pres-
ervation and downzoning. It is also important to 
account for factors that are unique to the conten-
tious urban fringe environment. It also makes 
sense to integrate these factors into a coherent 
framework for conceptual purposes. Therefore, in 
this paper, the time frame (also a proxy for the 
depletion of open space) is used in developing a 
simplified conceptual framework for examining 
the motivations for substantial downzoning. Fur-
ther below, the framework is expanded via a 
theoretical model of substantial downzoning. 
  The temporal framework in Figure 1 helps ex-
plain the relationship between motivations and 
action (Adelaja 2004). The horizontal axis is ei-
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Figure 1. Preservation of Agricultural Land with Increasing Urbanization 
 
been depleted (both obviously are positively cor-
related). The long-term adverse effect of the ur-
ban environment on current farm profitability is 
depicted by ψa, while the positive effect on unre-
alized “speculative” profits is depicted by ψS. The 
tipping point, where the primary motivation for 
farming ultimately shifts from reliance on farm 
returns to reliance on speculative returns, is de-
picted by T* in the lower panel. To the right of 
T*, farmers rely more on the development value 
of their land, which becomes a key justification 
for remaining in farming. The market value of the 
land (vm) is the sum of the agricultural use value 
(vf) and the additional value of the land due to 
development (va). The latter is typically referred 
to as the “easement” value, for preservation pur-
poses. Given the non-renewable nature of open 
space and the inelastic demand for land in the 
development process, va should increase at an in-
creasing rate over time or with the depletion of 
open space (see Muth 1971, and Wisand and 
Muth 1972). The shape of the speculative return 
curve (ψS) in the upper panel derives from that of 
the easement value curve (va). 
  Given the perceived negative effects of urbani-
zation (on open space, air/water recharge, rural 
scenery, property values, and other public and 
private goods), the community may want to pre-
serve the status quo. To do so at a point like X*, 
it will need to have sufficient political and finan-
cial resources commensurate with va. However, 
since open space and its benefits are public goods, 
public resources available to preserve land (ra) 
are expected to lag behind the growth of ease-
ment values. This “value gap” concept reflects the 
notion that va – ra—which is also the proportion 
of open space desired but which cannot be pre-
served using market mechanisms—will become 
larger over time (or as open space is depleted) 
because preservation is a public good. 
  The “value gap” makes sense in the context of 
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ment value typically exceeds growth in what local 
taxpayers are willing to spend. One reason is that 
residential property value increases do not neces-
sarily translate into a proportionate increase in 
property tax revenues available for preservation 
since the latter is based on assessed values, which 
are less flexible than appraised values. Also, 
property tax rates do not adjust systematically. 
Furthermore, affluent or not, local voters tend to 
base the amount of local services they are willing 
to buy on their incomes—not on their property 
values. Based on the concept depicted in Figure 
1, it is hypothesized that the larger the value gap, 
the greater the desire of the public to supplement 
existing tools such as local open space taxes with 
a drastic regulatory strategy like substantial down-
zoning. Please note that Figure 1 makes implicit 
assumptions about the shapes of the speculative 
and agricultural returns and assumes that the 
value of development rights is related to the value 
of land in development (speculative returns). 
  Clearly, environments described by the zone to 
the right of X* in Figure 1 would create the at-
mosphere of intense political conflict that usually 
accompanies substantial downzoning proposals. 
High and rising land values will worsen the gap 
between the market price of desired development 
easements and the ability of the local community 
to raise preservation funds through taxes, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of substantial down-
zoning.
 Unfortunately, the gap between perceived 
optimal zoning and current zoning is unobserv-
able or unmeasurable in real life, but is reflected 
in the politician’s decision to pursue substantial 
downzoning. 
  Based on the above, it is hypothesized that at a 
single point in time, at the urban fringe, differ-
ences would exist in the motivation and propen-
sity to engage in substantial downzoning that are 
driven by variations in development pressure, 
land values, fiscal stress, remaining undeveloped 
open space, farm profitability, relative farm/non-
farm political clout, and other factors. It is also 
hypothesized that a community has the choice of 
whether to purchase open space, as in PDR or 
transfer of development rights (TDR) programs, 
or to “take” it, as with substantial downzoning, 
depending on the feasibilities of these alterna-
tives. It is further hypothesized that proponents of 
substantial downzoning push for this option when 
va (see Figure 1) is high and (i) the gap between 
the perceived optimal zoning level to adequately 
manage growth and (ii) the current density on un-
developed land in the community gets sufficiently 
large, while alternatives to downzoning do not 
appear as feasible. The conceptual framework is 
expanded further by developing a theoretical po-
litical economy model of substantial downzoning, 
which operationalizes the diametrically opposed 
interests of farmers and non-farm homeowners 
based on the influence of different interest groups 
on political or regulatory outcomes (see Peltzman 
1976, Hahn 1990, and Campos 1987). 
 
A Theoretical Model of “Substantial 
Downzoning” 
 
Two competing interest groups are assumed: (i) 
the farm community, who along with nonresident 
developers may be hurt by substantial downzon-
ing, and (ii) homeowners, other conservationists, 
and anti-growth advocates who comprise the ma-
jority of non-farm residents who vote. The oppos-
ing interests of these groups must be balanced by 
the government (Fischel 1985). 
 Let  φ be a zoning adjustment parameter that 
reflects the gap between (i) the desired zoning 
density (φ
+), defined as the optimal weighted-
average minimum lot size on undeveloped land 
that is perceived by policymakers to achieve the 
community’s growth management and preserva-
tion goals, and (ii) current zoning (φ
*), defined as 
current weighted-average minimum lot size on 
the undeveloped land in the community. That is, 
φ = φ
+ – φ
*. Note that φ
+ is greater than φ
* in an 
increasingly urbanizing area due to the view by 
local officials that larger lot sizes will slow down 
growth. Define α = 0 when φ = 0 and the decision 
maker perceives that there is no need to substan-
tially downzone. Further define α = 1 when φ is 
sufficiently large enough to warrant substantial 
downzoning (the decision maker perceives that 
the value of φ
+ – φ
* justifies taking the political 
risk to significantly downzone). Although these 
extremes are chosen to illustrate the dichotomy 
between significant downzoning and the status 
quo, they clearly demonstrate the nature and com-
plexity of the choice faced by the political deci-
sion maker. 
  The farmer-landowner community believes that 
α = 0, desires a low level of α, and wants the 
politician to share his or her belief. To the farmer-Adelaja and Gottlieb  The Political Economy of Downzoning   187 
 
 
landowner, a relatively large value of α is a threat 
that could lead to a “takings,” which will reduce 
his or her development potential and future capi-
tal gains on land. On the other hand, homeowners 
and other proponents believe that α = 1 and want 
the politicians to take their side. This is especially 
so in the absence of the willingness or ability to 
meet the farmer in the marketplace (through PDR, 
for example). Subject to a set of conditions and 
preference factors, homeowners will lobby the 
governing body for α = 1, while farmer-landown-
ers will lobby for α = 0. The political decision 
maker must endogenously consider the optimal 
level of α, the level that maximizes his or her own 
utility (0 or 1). The utility-maximizing behavior 
of this decision maker is expressed below. 
 
Elected Officials’ Choice of α 
 
The government, which comprises elected repre-
sentatives of the people, both farm and non-farm, 
behaves rationally in the sense that it decides only 
on such measures as it believes would raise its 
electoral prospects (see Hahn 1990). The utility 
function of the government may thus be regarded 
the same as the expected total vote function: 
(1)  (, ) (, )
Gf n uV F N ==Π α +Π α xz , 
where F is the voting population of farm house-
holds,  N is the voting population of non-farm 
households, f and n are superscripts for farmers 
and non-farmers, П
i is the probability that the 
average  ith group household will vote for the 
government, i = f, n, x is a vector of preference 
factors or other local conditions that affect П
f 
(conditional on α), and z is a vector of preference 
and other factors that affect П
n, conditional on α. 
Equation (1) suggests that a stakeholder’s support 
for a candidate will depend on that candidate’s 
implementation of policies favorable to his or her 
interest. 
  The following household vote probability func-
tions capture voting preferences related to zoning 
restrictiveness as well as other factors: 
(2)  (, ) ()
f cd
γ Πα = −α xx  
(3)  (, ) () ( 1 )
n gh
γ Πα = − − α xz , 
where γ > 1; c, g, d(x), h(z) > 0; c is the prob-
ability that the average farm household will vote 
for the politician if α = 0; and g is the probability 
that the average non-farm household will vote for 
the politician if α = 1. Thus, c and g are vote 
probabilities based on “all other” factors, which is 
what remains if the politician eliminates lot size 
as an issue by selecting either group’s optimal 
choice (α = 0 for farmers, α = 1 for non-farmers). 
 With  c and g as intercepts in the vote probabil-
ity functions, contextual and preference factors x 
and z enter as arguments to non-negative slope 
functions d(x) and h(z) that reduce each house-
hold’s utility as a result of choices of α that are 
less than optimal for each household type. In the 
context of a strictly theoretical model, one may 
assume that d(x) and h(z) are scaled so that the 
resulting probabilities П can never be negative. 
  Equations (2) and (3) define the members of 
groups F and N such that  0
f
α Π <  and  0
n
α Π>. 
Following Fischel (1985), we assume diminishing 
marginal utility for additional increments of zon-
ing restrictiveness/lack of restrictiveness. This is 
the reason for the positive exponent γ in equa-
tions (2) and (3). It can be shown, consistent with 
this assumption, that  0
f
αα Π <  and  0
n
αα Π< . For 
any element x in vector x that increases the inten-
sity of farmers’ existing zoning preferences with 
α fixed,  0
f
x Π < . The essential amplification role 
played by any element of x means that  0.
f
x α Π< 
A reasonable behavioral assumption about dimin-
ishing marginal effects within function g(x) 
suggests that  0
f
xx Π > . The partial derivatives for 
non-farm households may be found by analogy: 
0
n
z Π > ,  0
n
zz Π < , and  0
n
z α Π > . 
  Returning to equation (1), the first-order condi-







α∂ α ∂ α
. 
In order for equation (4) to define a maximum, 







ααα α = Π+Π
α
. 
Given the assumptions, this expression is nega-
tive such that the condition in equation (4) unam-
biguously defines a maximum. Although the choice 
variable is restricted to the range 0 to 1, there can 
be no corner solution to the vote-maximization 
problem as long as the community contains at 188   October 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
least one farmer and one non-farmer—thus justi-
fying our use of the first-order condition in equa-
tion (4). This is proven next. 
  The condition in equation (5) shows that the 
expected vote function is strictly concave. To 
demonstrate that the optimum will occur away 
from the constraints in the domain, at a place 
where condition (4) holds, it is therefore suffi-
cient to show that the expected vote function has 
a positive slope in the immediate vicinity of α = 0 
and a negative slope in the immediate vicinity of 
α =1. Let ε be an infinitesimally small increment. 
Then, for the left-hand side of the restricted do-
main, this condition is equivalent to saying that 
V(α = 0) < V(α = ε). For the right-hand side of 
the restricted domain, it is equivalent to saying 
that V(α = 1– ε) > V(α = 1). 
  Now, consider first the right-hand-side con-
straint, which is probably the more important one 
in the context of non-farm majorities. The condi-
tion for a negative slope in the vicinity of α =1 
may be expressed using the full specification of V 
in equation (1) and substituting the vote prob-
abilities in equations (2) and (3): 
 
(6) [( 1 ) ] ( )() F cd N gh F cd N g
γγ −− ε + − ε > − +. 
 
The arguments to functions d and h are omitted 

























and  Fd/Nh is always positive when there is at 
least one farmer, and cannot be infinitesimally 
small, there will always be a value of ε for which 
the inequality holds. A similar proof, not shown 
here, exists for α in the vicinity of 0. 
  If there are no farmers, then Fd/Nh = 0 and a 
corner solution will occur, reflecting the intuition 
that there is no political downside to adopting the 
non-farmers’ zoning program. The complete ab-
sence of farmers is unlikely in communities ac-
tively considering substantial downzoning, which 
makes sense only for land that is developable: for 
the most part, farmland. When farmers do exist, 
the logic above suggests that even solutions that 
meet the first-order condition can be extremely 
close to the constraints on α—an “almost” corner 
solution. Given our sample of communities that 
mostly contain farmers, using a Lagrangean to 
account for these four cases would complicate the 
model without adding explanatory value. In sam-
ples where one or the other interest group is com-
pletely missing, the possibility of a corner solu-
tion must obviously be taken more seriously. 
  The optimal level of α (α*) selected by elected 
officials to maximize votes can be defined as a 
function of the exogenous variables. To accom-
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fn FN αα αα φ =Π+Π< and k and m are the 
number of exogenous variables in x and z respec-
tively. Examining changes in one variable at a 


















































  The signs on equations (9) and (10) confirm the 
basic political intuition that the higher the ratio of 
homeowners to farmers in the community, the 
greater the likelihood of substantial downzoning. 
Furthermore, an increase in any exogenous vari-
able x
i reduces the vote-maximizing level of α* 
chosen by the politician, while an increase in any 
exogenous variable z
i  increases the vote-maxi-
mizing level of α*. Note that vectors x and z 
could conceivably share a common element, in Adelaja and Gottlieb  The Political Economy of Downzoning   189 
 
 
which case the total effect of that factor on α* 
will be the sum of the expressions in (11) and 
(12), with the sign of the combined expression 
determined by the number of farmers and non-
farmers, and by the nature of functions d(x) and 
h(z). 
  Minimum average lot size of undeveloped land 
in a community at a single point in time is diffi-
cult to observe and requires detailed map work 
and the examination of ordinances for particular 
zones. Because the process of urbanization in 
New Jersey’s communities is uni-directional, the 
typical rezoning case is one in which farmers are 
slowly replaced by non-farmers, with the result 
that the pre-existing zoning regime, which satis-
fied equation (1), is no longer optimal from the 
politician’s point of view. Thus any empirical 
study of substantial downzoning is actually a 
study of the politics of re-equilibrating zoning 
regulations so that they accord with equation (1), 
effectively “catching up” to the community’s 
changed demography and political preferences. 
When land prices rise rapidly, the “value gap 
hypothesis” helps explain the choice of down-
zoning over less controversial growth manage-
ment tools. Elements of the x and z vectors are 
anticipated by the two opposing groups and help 
explain the levels of enthusiasm (or anger) 
captured in the vote probability functions (2) and 
(3). The outcome variable is substantial down-
zoning (yes or no), a variable which can be col-
lected at the municipal level if one can determine 
the difference between downzoning that is typical 
for a community and substantial downzoning, 
which is more controversial. 
 
Data and Estimation 
 
The zoning adjustment parameter, α, was treated 
above as a continuous variable. However, in real 
life, α is observable only as a binary choice vari-
able. In the case of New Jersey, communities rou-
tinely adjusted their zoning over time. However, 
these zoning adjustments became quite substan-
tial and controversial after 1995 when a favorable 
New Jersey Supreme Court ruling in Kirby v. 
Bedminster appeared to make municipalities bolder 
in their use of the downzoning tool. Communities 
typically change their zoning as part of a master 
plan update, which involves more than mere 
tinkering. Also, in New Jersey the typical mini-
mum lot size on agricultural land varies widely by 
community. At one extreme are communities that 
already maintain low minimum lot size restric-
tions. At the other extreme are communities that 
maintain large minimum lot size restrictions. 
What might be considered a significant enough 
downzoning for a community depends on the cur-
rent minimum lot size. Therefore, a decision had 
to be arbitrarily made about the level of down-
zoning that was significant enough to be consi-
dered a major change in municipal policy. 
  The authors sought the input of a number of 
farmers and planners actively involved in contro-
versial downzoning incidents regarding the level 
of downzoning that was significant enough to 
constitute substantial downzoning. Given the varia-
tions in minimum lot size prior to zoning change, 
this standardization allowed the construction of 
the substantial downzoning variable. 
  An increase in minimum lot size of at least 50 
percent, at least 1 acre, and extending over at 
least 1 percent or more of a municipality’s land 
area was considered to be significant enough to 
constitute “substantial” downzoning. While this 
combination appears somewhat arbitrary, anec-
dotally it mirrors the communities that experi-
enced significant angst among various interest 
groups involved in the downzoning process. To 
obtain primary municipal-level data on the sub-
stantial downzoning variable and other causal 
factors, the authors conducted the New Jersey 
Municipal Zoning Survey (NJMZS) in the spring 
of 2004. It was administered to the 278 municipal 
governments in the state that reported the pres-
ence of agricultural activity and that were located 
outside of fully urbanized areas. Appropriate rep-
resentatives of the 278 municipalities (mostly 
zoning and planning officials) were surveyed by 
telephone, 266 of whom provided full responses 
to our survey questions (a response rate of 96 per-
cent). Respondents were asked whether they had 
passed a downzoning ordinance that significantly 
increased minimum lot sizes in the undeveloped 
portion of the community at any time since 1995. 
(The year 1995 was the time frame that experts 
have indicated they began to notice a sharp up-
swing in the practice of downzoning.) None dis-
agreed with the definition of “substantial down-
zoning” conveyed to them. 
  Survey respondents, who were generally zon-
ing administrators, answered yes or no to the sub-190   October 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
stantial downzoning question based on the defi-
nition we provided. When the answer was yes, 
they provided the date of the substantial down-
zoning and the lot sizes before and after, when 
such information was available. Most communi-
ties that identified themselves as experiencing 
substantial downzoning exceeded the tripartite 
thresholds easily. The overwhelming majority of 
communities had actually downzoned to levels 
above 20 acres. 
  Information was also obtained about minimum 
residential lot sizes before and after any signifi-
cant downzoning. When municipalities provided 
this information, it was often in the form of mul-
tiple lot sizes for different zoning classifications. 
Therefore, the decision to downzone was evalu-
ated via a dichotomous variable: yes = 1 and no = 
0. Independent variables had to be constructed 
from data available from a number of sources, 
based on guidance provided by our theoretical 
framework and some past studies. The proxies 
used for the independent variables are shown in 
Table 1, along with the mean values for each. 
  Given the absence of data directly reflecting 
the strength of the “anti-growth” lobby (a clear 
unobservable), the best available proxy (relative 
strength) was used. Following Gottlieb and Ade-
laja (2004), who showed that non-farmers benefit 
from substantial downzoning through enhanced 
property values (amenity benefits argument), a 
simplifying assumption was made that non-farm-
ers will lobby for substantial downzoning. Given 
the cross-sectional nature of the data, one would 
expect a continuum from a high relative strength 
of the non-farm community to a high relative 
strength of the farm community. So, the anti-
growth movement is simply defined to include all 
non-farm residents. This is consistent with Ade-
laja and Friedman’s (1999) work on the right-to-
farm issue, which proxied the political strength of 
the farm community by the farmers’ share of the 
total population. Like the anti-growth movement, 
the rest of the non-farm community is assumed to 
have a vested interest in substantial downzoning. 
  We acknowledge the fact that non-farmers may 
be neutral and may not lobby for downzoning. 
However, there is no reason to believe that the 
percentage of the non-farm public that is neutral 
will systematically vary across jurisdiction. There-
fore, the relative size of the farm community was 
chosen as a proxy for the strength of the farm 
community or the inverse of the strength of the 
anti-growth movement. This may explain why in 
many communities, substantial downzoning es-
sentially degenerates into a conflict between farm-
ers, who typically own the vast majority of farm-
land in their community, and the non-farm public, 
which will typically be led by environmentalists 
and other anti-growth activists. 
  This simplifying assumption implies that farm-
ers are essentially the opposition and their 
strength is inverse to that of the proponents. 
Therefore, farmers as a percentage of all occupa-
tions in a community in 1990 (%FARMERS) was 
used as a proxy for the voter head count variable. 
The fact that the places where substantial down-
zoning occurred tended to be those places where 
the farm population was minimal or where it had 
significantly declined, lends credence to our choice 
of %FARMERS. %FARMERS is expected to have a 
negative impact on the probability of substantial 
downzoning, other things equal. %NON-FARMERS 
is not included, of course, because of its perfect 
collinearity with %FARMERS. Equations (9) and 
(10) suggest that %FARMERS should be used as 
an interaction term with various contextual or 
preference factors. However, experiments with 
such interaction terms did not produce significant 
results and were not included in the results 
section. 
  Farmers’ preference variables (x) include aver-
age farm size (FARMSIZE) and percentage change 
in the value of vacant land (∆VACANTVAL). It is 
hypothesized that the larger the farm size, the 
higher the cost of downzoning to the farm public 
and the higher the degree of opposition by 
farmers. With respect to ∆VACANTVAL, which is 
defined as change in the value of all undeveloped 
land other than farmland and associated wood-
lands, this variable should reflect greater cost of 
downzoning to the farmer. In other words, the 
value of undeveloped land reflects the develop-
ment value of farmland, which when compared 
with the agricultural value reflects the easement 
value. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the prob-
ability of the farmer voting against substantial 
downzoning would increase with ∆VACANTVAL, 
leading to a reduced likelihood that substantial 
downzoning would pass. 
 A  number  of  intensity of preference variables 
(z) are specified for non-farmers. Given the stated 
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(INCOME) is expected to have a positive impact 
on the probability of substantial downzoning, re-
flecting the notion that preservation of rural char-
acter and other environmental amenities is a lux-
ury good (Baldassare 1981). 
  The proportion of residents who hold white 
collar (managerial and professional) jobs (WCOL-
LAR) is expected to increase the probability of 
substantial downzoning because of the political 
skills required to mobilize an anti-growth coali-
tion (Logan 1976, Protash and Baldassare 1983). 
This variable has the same predicted sign as 
median household income, and is understandably 
correlated with it. Finally, the higher the percent-
age of voters who are owner-occupiers (OWNER-
OC), the larger the number of non-farmers with a 
housing asset they wish to protect using the 
substantial downzoning tool. The hypothesized 
sign on this variable is positive. 
  The percentage of the governing body that 
belongs to the Democratic Party (DEMOCRAT) is 
hypothesized to increase with the probability of 
substantial downzoning, suggesting that Demo-
crats will be less hampered than Republicans by a 
property rights ideology, will value the environ-
ment more heavily than concerns about regulatory 
“takings,” and are more likely to support the non-
farm majority. Therefore, DEMOCRAT is classi-
fied under the z vector. The use of this variable 
assumes considerable stability in party control, 
since the substantial downzoning could have oc-
curred any time between 1995 and 2004. 
  Variables related to municipal fiscal stress 
could affect the selection of substantial down-
zoning over other tools. Such variables selected 
include the equalized tax rate in 1995 (TAX) and 
per capita debt burden in 1990 (DEBT). Both 
variables should therefore be positively related to 
the choice of substantial downzoning. Senior citi-
zens are expected to be more conservative when 
it comes to fiscal matters, so the proportion of 
residents over 65 (SENIOR) is also included as a 
fiscal stress factor, with the expectation of a posi-
tive relationship. 
  The final set of variables in the z vector meas-
ure urgency and environmental resources at risk. 
These variables are hypothesized to motivate the 
non-farm majority to act. One would expect the 
hypothesized coefficients of these variables to be 
positive. 
  If most of the community’s open space is al-
ready gone, one might expect there is nothing left 
to protect and therefore limited interest in sub-
stantial downzoning. Furthermore, communities 
with more open space may have more anti-growth 
advocates that lobby for substantial downzoning, 
as such people are likely to reside in areas with 
more open space. Therefore, a positive coefficient 
is anticipated for open space as a proportion of 
the community’s total land area in 1995 (OPEN-
SPACE). A squared term for this variable (OPEN-
SPACE2) is included to account for the following 
possibilities: (i) when there is a great deal of open 
space, it is not viewed as being at risk and so the 
decision might be to do nothing; (ii) when there is 
very little open space left, preserving it may be 
regarded as a lost cause; and (iii) between these 
two extremes, homeowners are more likely to 
decide to take action. 
  ∆VACANTVAL is included as a farmers’ prefer-
ence variable to reflect the conflict between farm-
ers and non-farmers. It was hypothesized that 
increased  ∆VACANTVAL leads to greater opposi-
tion to substantial downzoning by farmers. How-
ever, increased ∆VACANTVAL could reflect higher 
potential benefit from substantial downzoning to 
the non-farm public, and therefore greater advo-
cacy by non-farmers for substantial downzoning. 
The net effect of this struggle itself reflects rela-
tive political clout. If it is negative, then farmers 
are either more sensitive to or are better moti-
vated by this variable. 
 The  variables  ∆POP, %DEVELOPED, ∆VACANT-
VAL, and ∆RESIDVAL all represent different as-
pects of growth pressure and urgency. ∆POP, 
which measures population growth in the county 
in which the municipality sits, captures whether 
or not communities substantially downzone in 
response to population growth outside their own 
borders.  ∆VACANTVAL has been previously dis-
cussed. ∆RESIDVAL, which is the average price of 
residential parcels, should have an effect similar 
to that of ∆VACANTVAL as it reflects development 
value of farmland. Following the logic in Fig-
ure 1, the hypothesized sign of ∆RESIDVAL is 
positive. 
  %DEVELOPED captures the psychological effect 
of rapid open space loss on non-farm residents. 
Its hypothesized sign is positive. It is essentially a 
dynamic version of OPENSPACE. The percentage 
of woodlands and wetlands (WETWOOD) is in-
tended to capture environmental motivations that 
differ from other growth control motivations (as 
in Adelaja and Friedman 1999). Adelaja and Gottlieb    The Political Economy of Downzoning   193 
 
 
  Three variables describe alternative preserva-
tion programs in each municipality. RTFTYPE 
captures the existing agricultural nuisance pro-
tection mechanisms in place. The variable is 
specified to have three levels: 0 for no right-to-
farm law, 1 for a weak right-to-farm law, and 2 
for a strong right-to-farm law at the local level 
(Adelaja and Friedman 1999). Data available on 
two types of open space acquisition programs 
were used to construct related variables: (i) acres 
enrolled in the state’s purchase of development 
rights program (PRESACRES), and (ii) the exis-
tence of a local open space tax (OPENTAX). 
  Alternative preservation programs could be 
complements or substitutes for substantial down-
zoning. Because farmers tend to support these 
programs, their presence in the community could 
reflect unmeasured political clout of farmers. 
Such existence would be expected to decrease the 
likelihood of substantial downzoning, suggesting 
that these programs are substitutes for it. Simi-
larly, non-farmers may regard alternative growth 
management policies as substitutes (they bring 
about the same outcome, and so not all are 
needed). Alternatively, prior existence of these 
alternative programs may mollify farmers to some 
extent, meaning that they will be more likely to 
accept substantial downzoning. This latter inter-
pretation, which implies complementarity, is most 
likely in the case of PRESACRES. The reason is 
that substantial downzoning should be a less sig-
nificant issue for farmers who have already sold 
their development rights. Similarly, municipali-
ties that choose one growth management tool may 
be more likely to also choose others (comple-
mentarity), reflecting particularly aggressive pres-
ervation motives on the part of the non-farm 
majority. 
  Figure 1 tells a story of complementarity: when 
preservation needs become urgent, the non-farm 
majority turns to substantial downzoning to make 
up the gap in its acquisition program if the “value 
gap” is significant. Having observed the debates 
surrounding downzoning conflicts, the authors 
strongly suspect that farmers are not mollified by 
right-to-farm ordinances or PDR programs to the 
point where they are willing to accede to sub-
stantial downzoning. Many farmers regard this 
action as the “taking” of a fundamental right, and 
tend to oppose it even if it does not affect them 
personally. In addition, the idea that various pres-
ervation tools are substitutes sounds a bit arcane 
for environmentalists and other activists mount-
ing a full-court press against growth. The matter 
of funds available for outright acquisition, a logi-
cal determinant of why one policy might be sub-
stituted for the other, is modeled using separate 
variables such as debt and taxes. For these rea-
sons, we hypothesize that alternative preservation 
programs are complements to substantial down-
zoning, to the extent that non-farmers dominate 
the political process. This hypothesis is indicated 
in Table 1 in brackets because it is a complex 
aggregate that captures preferences, clouts, and 
the sizes of the two opposing groups. 
  One potential approach is to estimate a nested 
logit model, with one set of covariates determin-
ing the choice to mount any preservation effort, 
and a second set determining the choice to sub-
stantially downzone. This was not feasible, for 
three reasons: (i) the four preservation tools on 
which data is available do not represent a com-
prehensive list of all such tools, (ii) the tools are 
not disjoint, and (iii) anecdotal evidence suggests 
huge variations across communities in the timing 
between the decision to do something and when 
the appropriate tool is chosen. Instead, the fol-
lowing two-stage approach is used in estimating 
the model. First, a set of logit models of the prob-
ability of downzoning is estimated, with both so-
cioeconomic variables and alternative tools as co-
variates (this addresses the complement/substitute 
question). Second, the alternative preservation 
tools are omitted from among the covariates in a 
model of the probability of the use of any of the 
three local growth management tools, using only 
socioeconomic, preference, and contextual factors 
as regressors. 
  The first set of logit models, which relate to the 
probability of substantial downzoning, were speci-
fied as follows: 
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where P(DOWNZONEyes) is the probability that a 
municipality has substantially downzoned, Σkbkrk  
is a linear combination of k regressors and coeffi-
cients, and ε is an independent and normally dis-
tributed random error term with a mean of zero 





Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients and 
standard errors for the three full models of the 
probability that New Jersey communities adopted 
substantial downzoning between 1995 and 2004. 
The marginal effect of each causal variable on the 
probability of substantial downzoning over one 
standard deviation of each covariate is also in-
cluded. The first specification contains all of the 
covariates, the second is the result of a stepwise 
procedure, and the third, marked “preferred,” is 
essentially the full model minus a small number 
of covariates regarded as collinear/redundant. A 
specific example of the difference between the 
full and preferred specification is the dropping of 
FARMSIZE. As a marker for rural character, 
FARMSIZE can be expected to exhibit a three-way 
collinearity with OPENSPACE and %FARMER, po-
tentially masking the impact of those two im-
portant variables. The results section is based on 
the findings of the “preferred” model. 
  All of the statistically significant coefficients 
have the expected signs. OPENSPACE has a posi-
tive coefficient, as well as the largest measured 
impact on the probability of substantial down-
zoning. This confirms two possible hypotheses: 
(i) communities tend to act when there is some-
thing significant to protect, and (ii) communities 
with more open space are more likely to have a 
stronger anti-growth movement that lobbies for 
substantial downzoning because people with such 
preferences are likely to reside in areas with more 
open space. Although it was significant and nega-
tive in the stepwise model, OPENSPACE2 was 
dropped in the final model to reduce collinearity. 
 The  coefficient  of  %FARMER was negative, as 
expected, and supports the farmer political clout 
argument. The incidence of substantial down-
zoning is therefore expected to grow as the 
number of farmer-dominated places dwindles, 
leading to declines in farmers’ political clout. 
This is consistent with Adelaja and Friedman 
(1999), who predict a systematic weakening of 
protective mechanisms for farming. The positive 
coefficient of OPENSPACE combined with the 
negative coefficient on %FARMER suggests that 
those communities with extensive farmland base 
but declining farm population are particularly 
vulnerable. The possibility of the farm com-
munity implementing strong advance protective 
mechanisms while they still have sufficient clout 
was discussed by Adelaja and Friedman (1999). 
Such advance approaches might also be appro-
priate in the case of substantial downzoning. 
  Recall that both ∆VACANTVAL and ∆RESIDVAL 
somewhat reflect the opportunity cost of farmland 
in development (development value). The differ-
ence between the development value and the ag-
ricultural value of farmland is the easement value. 
Recall also that the easement value minus the 
funding available for farmland preservation is the 
value gap. Therefore, holding the agricultural 
value and farmland preservation funding avail-
able constant, both ∆VACANTVAL and ∆RESIDVAL 
should reflect a value-gap increase. The signifi-
cant and positive coefficient of ∆VACANTVAL 
supports the value-gap hypothesis. However, the 
insignificance of the coefficient of ∆RESIDVAL 
(the residential equivalent of ∆VACANTVAL) sug-
gests that land affordability, not housing afforda-
bility, drives the choice to substantially down-
zone. ∆RESIDVAL is likely more affected by hous-
ing demand and supply, while ∆VACANTVAL is 
likely more affected by land supply and demand. 
The latter is more relevant to the hypothesis of 
substantial downzoning. Interestingly, while the 
cost of land acquisition is found to drive the choice 
to downzone, fiscal capacity variables (DEBT, 
TAX) are not found to be significant drivers. 
  The coefficients of OPENTAX and RTFTYPE 
variables are positive and significant at the 10 
percent level, suggesting that the non-farm ma-
jority uses the many preservation tools as com-
plements. As Figure 1 suggests, the non-farm 
majority is not anti-farmer, but pro-open–space. 
They do not actively prefer downzoning to such 
farmer-friendly tools as right-to-farm and open 
space acquisition. Taken together, the results ap-
pear to suggest that they use substantial down-
zoning as a supplementary tool when prices move 
out of reach and the urgency of the situation 
leaves them with fewer alternatives. As suggested 
above, with the open space tax variable, these 
results may also reflect the fact that the anti-
growth movement self-select to live in such com-
munities where the propensity to fund farmland 
preservation through open space taxes is higher. 
The significant and positive coefficient of ∆POP 
reflects the positive influence of growth pressure 
in the larger region on the local prospects for sub-
stantial downzoning. Adelaja and Gottlieb    The Political Economy of Downzoning   195 
 
 
Table 2. Results of Logit Model of Probability That Municipality Will Have “Substantially 
Downzoned” Since 1995 
  FULL SPECIFICATION  STEPWISE SPECIFICATION  PREFERRED SPECIFICATION 
Observations 266  266  266 














INTERCEPT  -6.029**   -7.1735**    -2.9651     
  (2.9356)   (1.2818)    (2.3462)     
%FARMER  -0.1509 -5.2      -0.2908  **  -10.9 
  (0.1345)       (0.1235)     
FARMSIZE  0.00111 5.3  0.00136**  6.5       
  (0.000775)   (0.000682)         
INCOME  -0.00002 -2.7      -0.00001    -1.5 
  (0.000039)       (0.000029)     
WCOLLAR  0.5614 0.8           
  (3.9694)            
RTFTYPE  0.4026* 5.2      0.4402  *  6.3 
  (0.2415)       (0.2397)     
OWNEROC  0.00727 1.6      0.00801    1.9 
  (0.0168)       (0.0163)     
OPENSPACE  0.1258** 60.8  0.1607** 78.2  0.0366  **  19.3 
  (0.052)   (0.0449)    (0.0122)     
OPENSPACE2  -0.00087 -43.8  -0.00118**  -59.8       
  (0.000454)   (0.000382)         
WETWOOD  -0.0031 -1.1      -0.0128    -4.8 
  (0.0111)       (0.00995)     
PRESACRES  0.00022 1.4     0.000235    1.6 
  (0.000496)       (0.000506)     
OPENTAX  0.7438* 6.4  1.0758**  9.3  0.7927  *  7.4 
  (0.4254)   (0.3417)    (0.397)     
DEMOCRAT  -0.00144 -0.8      -0.00103    -0.6 
  (0.00618)       (0.00597)     
TAX  -0.3242 -2.2      -0.3629    -2.7 
  (0.5268)       (0.5194)     
DEBT  0.00547 3.8      0.0063    4.8 
  (0.00532)       (0.005)     
SENIOR  -0.043 -3.7      -0.0447    -4.2 
  (0.0353)       (0.0346)     
%DEVELOPED  -0.00562 -1.3      -0.0151    -3.9 
  (0.0317)       (0.0266)     
∆POP  0.084* 5.6      0.0927  *  6.8 
  (0.0508)       (0.0487)     
∆VACANTVAL  0.00272** 7.1  0.00332** 8.7  0.00274  **  7.8 
  (0.00119)   (0.00109)    (0.00119)     
∆RESIDVAL  0.00275 1.8      0.0018    1.3 
  (0.00477)       (0.00477)     
Note: ** is significant at the 5 percent level. * is significant at the 10 percent level. 196   October 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
  As shown in Table 2, the large list of political 
(e.g., DEMOCRAT), socioeconomic (e.g., INCOME, 
WCOLLAR, and OWNEROC), and other preference 
factors (e.g., ∆RESIDVAL) are generally not signi-
ficant. As mentioned above, these variables may 
be insignificant because of the presence of alter-
native preservation programs among the covari-
ates (Table 2 effectively models the choice of 
downzoning conditional on the existence of a set 
of tools that have similar motivations and objec-
tives). As part of our second stage analysis, we 
specified the presence of “any preservation pro-
gram” as the dependent variable and eliminated 
the alternative growth management programs as 
independent variables (Logan 1976, Baldassare 
1981, Protash and Baldassare 1983, Kline and 
Wichelns 1994). Two models that omit alterna-
tive growth management tools as regressors are 
therefore estimated, and the results are presented 
in Table 3. 
  Model 1 in Table 3 shows the probability of 
substantial downzoning as a function of prefer-
ence factors, but not of alternative tools. Model 2 
contains the same regressors, but it models the 
probability that a town will select either down-
zoning, open space tax, or a right-to-farm ordi-
nance. The models in Table 3 allow a focus on 
the decision to “do anything” in pursuit of preser-
vation (acres in the state PDR program are omit-
ted because this is an interval variable that is also 
less likely to be a matter of local political choice). 
  The results in Table 3 support the notion that 
the alternative tools are related. When all preser-
vation policies are lumped together, community 
per capita income becomes a significant variable 
with the predicted positive effect on the decision 
to “do anything,” but not on the decision to “sub-
stantially downzone.” Conversely, growing per 
capita municipal debt increases the likelihood of 
adopting any preservation policy, but not the 
likelihood of adopting substantial downzoning. 
This suggests that its role is not related to the 
extra cost of buying land, but rather to the deci-
sion to stop growth by whatever means in order to 
forestall future infrastructure spending. This re-
sult is consistent with that reported in Ihlanfeldt 
(2004), but the distinction between the fiscal mo-
tivations underlying downzoning and other pres-
ervation tools represents a new finding. 
  In contrast to downzoning, preservation in the 
aggregate does not seem to respond to either of 
the included urgency factors (∆POP,  ∆VACANT-
VAL). This stands to reason when one considers 
the fact that substantial downzoning can lead to 
politically bruising battles, even if the outcome of 
those battles is pre-ordained by majority rule. The 
contentiousness of substantial downzoning is one 
of the things that make it a last resort, to be used 
when conditions are urgent. An intriguing finding 
presented in Table 3 is that communities with 
more farmers are less likely to adopt preservation 
tools in the aggregate. This is a sharp contrast to 
Furuseth (1985a, 1985b), who found that com-
munities with more farmers are more likely to 
adopt preservation. We explain the difference 
based on the urban fringe focus of the present 
study. 
  The finding that WETWOOD is inversely related 
to the probability of downzoning or adopting any 
preservation tool suggests that none of the poli-
cies are seen as remedies to concerns about these 
environmental amenities. The fact that the WET-
WOOD variable inversely measures the percentage 
of farmland that is arable suggests, however, that 
this variable may in fact bring urgency in through 
the back door, since agricultural land is more 
suited to housing developments than to steep 




Anecdotal evidence suggests that “substantial 
downzoning” is more prevalent at the urban 
fringe than elsewhere at the moment. However, 
the growing incidence of its use, and the set of 
factors that appear to be present in communities 
that have used this regulatory approach, suggest 
the emergence of a tool that will be used more 
frequently in the future. Although substantial 
downzoning is controversial, better understanding 
of the dynamics of its implementation would be 
of great value to both its proponents and 
opponents. 
  This study makes several unique contributions 
to the literature on land use. First, it identifies and 
analyzes the political determinants of a possible 
emerging growth management tool that is rela-
tively easy to implement, albeit contentious. Sec-
ond, it advances understanding of the motivations 
and political-economic dynamics behind this tool 
by developing and estimating theoretical and em-
pirical public choice models that explicitly incor-
porate matters of money, power, conflict, timing, 
and sustainability. Third, it presents empirical Adelaja and Gottlieb    The Political Economy of Downzoning   197 
 
 
Table 3. Logit Models with Alternative Preservation Programs Omitted from Regressors 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
= 1 IF DOWNZONED 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
= 1 IF ANY PRESERVATION PROGRAM 
Observations  266       266    
-2 LOG L  255.45        224.25     
Parameter  Estimate    Change in Probability    Estimate    Change in Probability 
INTERCEPT  -2.3613     -2.9171  
  (2.2026)     (2.4043)  
%FARMER  -0.2627** -9.9    -0.2408** -7.9 
  (0.1074)     (0.1074)  
INCOME  -6.89E-06 -1.0    0.000142**  18.0 
  (0.000028)     (0.000046)  
OWNEROC  0.0146 3.5    0.0222 4.6 
  (0.0153)     (0.016)  
OPENSPACE  0.043** 22.8    0.0504** 23.2 
  (0.0115)     (0.0107)  
WETWOOD  -0.0208** -7.8    -0.027** -8.8 
  (0.00902)     (0.0102)  
DEMOCRAT  -0.00229 -1.4    0.0037  2.0 
  (0.00588)     (0.00574)  
TAX  -0.4963 -3.7    -0.8257 -5.4 
  (0.5017)     (0.5243)  
DEBT  0.00782 6.0    0.0136**  9.1 
  (0.00487)     (0.00588)  
SENIOR  -0.0526 -4.9    -0.0071 -0.6 
  (0.0357)     (0.036)  
%DEVELOPED  -0.00342 -0.9    0.00838  1.9 
  (0.0218)     (0.0146)  
∆POP  0.0847* 6.2    -0.0356  -2.3 
  (0.0465)     (0.0508)  
∆VACANTVAL  0.00305** 8.7    0.000916  2.3 
  (0.00116)     (0.00133)  
∆RESIDVAL  0.00092 0.7    0.00224 1.4 
  (0.00457)     (0.00473)  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** is significant at the 5 percent level. * is significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
tests of the substitutability or complementarity of 
alternative growth management tools in a local 
setting, including substantial downzoning. Fourth, 
it brings substantial downzoning into the main-
stream of known policy tools for dealing with 
growth management at the urban fringe, such as 
farmland preservation (Furuseth 1985a, 1985b) 
and right-to-farm (Adelaja and Friedman 1999). 
  The study’s main findings suggest that substan-
tial downzoning is, at least in part, a response to a 
“value gap.” Politicians count votes when they 
decide whether or not to substantially downzone, 
although Democrats are no more likely to engage 
in substantial downzoning than Republicans. 
Overall, preservation activities tend to appear in 
affluent places with somewhat fewer working 
farmers and with plenty of open space to protect. 
While virtually every New Jersey community can 
be said to be at some risk for development, sub-
stantial downzoning was the only tool that re-
sponded directly to growth in population and land 
values. 
  In 57 percent of the communities involved in 
this study, open space taxes are the most widely 198   October 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
used tool, followed by downzoning, at 32 percent, 
and right-to-farm ordinances, at 26 percent. Open 
space taxes likely involve the least political con-
flict of the three, especially to the extent to which 
they are merely authorized and not always fully 
used. As growth pressures continue to spread and 
urban residents move into rural areas, displacing 
farm and traditional rural communities, the inci-
dence of substantial downzoning is expected to 
increase throughout the United States. That is, 
while many communities might consider it an un-
likely tool now, the dynamics of suburbanization 
suggest its emergence as a more frequently used 
growth management tool in the future. 
  One policy-relevant implication is noteworthy 
for New Jersey, where the State Development and 
Redevelopment Plan (SDRP) designates various 
areas for specific land uses. Whether the vision of 
the SDRP can be achieved in a state with such a 
strong Home Rule tradition is now a matter for 
concern. It is possible that widespread downzon-
ing could lead to a fringe landscape with densities 
that are too uniform, neither wholly rural nor 
properly mixed (Evans 2004). The widespread 
local  NIMBY-ism, in the guise of “substantial 
downzoning,” may therefore produce a residential 
landscape that even “smart growth” advocates 
would dislike. The local backlash to growth using 
the police power has surprised many in New Jer-
sey, causing state officials to revise downward 
their projections of residential densities going 
forward. In this case, as in so many others: where 
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